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Book Reviews
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS-A STUDY IN STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY.

By

ELVIN

R.

LATTY. CHICAGO: FOUNDATION PRESS,

1936. pp. xxvii, 225.

This is a book for which the profession has been waiting. It is indispensable
to the counsellor, the advocate or the judge who has to wrestle with those ancient,
puzzling, and much abused twin problems known as "the corporate entity" and
"piercing the corporate veil." It is the clearest analysis I have ever seen of the nature

of the true problems masked under those labels. Its treatment of the cases is at once
lawyerlike in the best tradition of the craft-sharp, shrewd, and well-arranged-and
jurisprudential in the best tradition of realism, cutting through words and formulas
to the meat of the matter, and seeking both explanation and justification of decisions
where, in any confused field, they are really to be found: to-wit, in the facts of
the situation and the needs of the situation. Altogether, an admirable job. It will
take its place on the eight-inch shelf of really worthwhile books on American corporation law. Particularly to be noted is Latty's skill in suggesting to the practicing
lawyer (by way of his jurisprudential analysis) new and unsuspected-and eminently
persuasive-waysof bringing precedents to bear, and of getting rid of his adversary's
authorities. Latty never loses sight of that surest test of a theory intended for use
in court: can it be made not only persuasive, but compelling, to the court?
His theories can be; and will be.
The book is not for casual reading. It requires to be studied. It repays the
study. It does call for patience. The style is at times verbose-though repetition
can be excused when the job is to get unfamiliar ideas across to a profession which
does not love the unfamiliar even when the unfamiliar offers help and comfort. And
Latty's climax, his last chapter, is so long delayed that one gets a bit irritated at having each successive chapter fail to bring it. I recommend reading the last chapter
immediately after the first, and then settling down to the bulk of the book.
The thesis is this: that the supposed conflict in rule and confusion in tendency
about when the "corporate entity" will insulate a stockholder (corporate or other)
from liability on corporate obligation, and when, on the other hand, the well-known
veil will be "pierced," is really a conflict and confusion only in language; (though
it has occasional untoward results in the decisions.) Look at the facts, the issues,
and the results, and you get a substantial harmony of actual outcome, and one
largely consonant with sense in the circumstances. The difficulty is that this sense
in the results is hidden under verbal formulas which obscure; and, further, that
these formulas in themselves give precisely no guidance to judge or lawyer as to
what will or should happen next. Few indeed are the cases in which such wellknown "tests" as "complete domination," "alter ego," "mere instrumentality" are
not satisfied equally, whether or not the court cuts through to collect from the stockholder. "Tests" which prove to be applicable equally when they are applied and
(256)

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1937], Art. 11
BOOK REVIEWS
when they are not, are signposts pointing North and South at once; they offer little
guidance. I do not say "no guidance," because a tiny trifle they do offer. Each of
the formulas suggests a policy which our law and our economy have approved. The
"entity" formula calls to mind that the gathering of capital or encouragement of
enterprise by providing limited liability is not a thing we frown on. The "mere cat's
paw" formula suggests that the corporate device can be, and in our experience has
been, turned to uses which look more like deception of creditors than like encouragement of legitimate enterprise. Some first indications of guidance, then, the two
formulas call up to mind; but then their utility for decision or for prediction ceases.
For either formula is equally available, in any case doubtful enough to get litigated,
and nothing in either formula or in their combination tells us when to choose which,
or when to expect a court to choose which. The formulas do indeed serve a further
minor function; they set the manner of discourse; they put into the mouth of counsel on either side the language in which his argument is to be clothed; they afford the
verbal tools of accepted rhetoric- for use in court. On one side, counsel will vociferate
about an independent entity authorized and created by the law itself; on the other
side, the air will hum with imputations of fraud upon the public by the sham and
pretense that the formal entity is independent. But as Latty shows, corporations are
not de facto independent of their stockholders; and cannot be; and should not be.
They exist to be "controlled." Some one must run even a legal entity. It would be a
sad world for stockholders if they were not controlled (indeed, it has been, where the
corporation has gotten away from the bulk of the stockholders.)
The truth is, then, that a corporation is not merely a group of real men who have
organized to do some type of business; nor merely the de facto acting unity created
by their having de facto organized into cooperative action; nor is it merely a legal
form for doing business with limited liability; nor is it merely an artficial legal creation which courts can deal with as if it were a single unity. It is in fact all of these
at once. And the key to dealing with it intelligently is to keep remembering that
fact, and the purpose of its existence. On these lines Latty's analysis proceeds.
I cannot attempt to set forth in full the keen dissection of the cases which characterizes the book from start to finish. I give only enough illustrations to bring
out that character.
Take, for instance, the difference between tort creditors and contract creditors;
and again, take the difference between informed and less informed contract creditors.
If bankers engage to lend to a subsidiary without insisting on the guarantee of the
parent (or to a closely held corporation without insisting on the endorsement of the
major stockholder), wherein should their rights differ from those of bankers who
lend to a business trust under express negation of the personal responsibility of the
trustees and cestuis? They have elected to limit their claims to a limited body of
assets. They were not only of age, but in a business calling for experience and judgment in just such matters. Short of fraud and the like, where is their complaint? I
am not so clear that this reasoning carries over comfortably to the small investor
who buys securities from an underwriting syndicate. And Latty begins to have
doubts about various types of merchandising or building creditor. Certainly, how-
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ever, no doubt at all can exist that one run down by the subsidiary's negligently
driven truck has made no such engagement to limit his rights thus-and the case for
cutting through grows stronger. "The great majority of cases denying such liability
are contract cases." But, urges Latty, why allow cutting through, even here, if the
subsidiary's assets have been set and allowed to stand at an amount adequate, in
the line of business concerned, to carry on the line of business with its normal run
of risks? As long as limited liability remains a policy we approve, so long liability
which is not sought to be limited beyond reason must remain limited-at the expense

even of this injured plaintiff. (The road to helping him lies in a different style of
handling automobile injuries.) In such a picture the imposition of liability on the
stockholder in the "milking" cases becomes almost inevitable; there the current
assets are depleted too fast, which is as bad as failure to provide the subsidiary with
adequate capital at the outset.
Again, the body of cases which, however they talk, involve in reality no problem
of creditors' cutting through at all, are carefully severed out and discussed under
their own true issues-with resulting illumination. So those involving the Clayton
or Elkins Acts, or attempts to secure jurisdiction over a parent by way of a subsidiary, or fraudulent conveyances, or the attempted use of a subsidiary to evade a
contract of the parent. Not the least interesting discussion is that which brings normal principles of tort and agency to bear, and marks off from parents' liability for
a subsidiary those cases in which one corporatiop is liable together with another,
either because of joint tort feasance (participation) or as a principal by whose own
direction the wrong was committed.
Such lines of cleavage and analysis would be exciting enough, in their clarification of the sticky hogwash which defaces the books on "corporate entity" and "veilpiercing," even if they rested purely in theory. But they do not rest in pure theory.
They present a theory which makes the cases talk sense instead of muddle. They
line up the decisions as no other attack has even begun to line them up. Once more

we learn the ancient lesson that when highly intelligent and trained men persist
for years in talking nonsense, it is because an issue has been badly posed; posed too
broadly and generally, so that there is enough truth on each side to convey the feeling of righteousness and the indignation of advocacy, and the will to win; but posed
so broadly and generally, too, that all arguments overshoot the mark. Latty, by
stripping the issue down to its bare, bald reality, makes it one which any lawyer
can talk sense about: when, and where, in this generally accepted and acceptable
institution of limited liability, does the good thing get to be too much of a "good"
thing-for the stockholder? That will not depend upon whether the stockholder
controls. It will depend upon what he or they have done with their control-or on
whether the complainant has not barred himself from claiming grievance. And
Latty shows that, to a surprising percentage, the courts have felt their way through
into sense, in terms of the true issue, though they have talked nonsense enough in
the process to sometimes fool their own successors. Thus, once more, the realistic
method of attacking a legal problem has proved its value: Legal doctrine lags behind
judicial instinct, here as so often, because lawyers and legal scholars pay too little
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attention to what courts are doing, too lop-sidedly much to what courts say in the
process of their doing. No one-certainly not Latty-would regard what courts say
as not worth the most careful study. But when that careful study fails to bring
clarity, it is time to get down to facts, issue, and result, and seek clarity. Rarely
will one fail to find it, then.
Latty has found it., Every corporation lawyer needs this book.

Columbia University Law School
By

PACIFIC MEANS.

By

MANLEY

K. N.
0.

LLEWELLYN

HUDSON. NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS,

1935. pp. vi, 200.
When we reflect that it is supposed to have taken humanity several centuries
to discover that it was foolish to continue to carry stones in one end of the grain
bag while the same was being transported, and when we recall that Mark Twain once
reminded us that it also took several centuries for some to give up the belief in
infant damnation, it should be no occasion for discouragement when we learn from
the author that it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that any
worthwhile peace movement of a wide scope occurred.
The book, which includes the text of four lectures given by the author in
1935 at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is divided into the following
main divisions:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

The Law of Pacific Settlement Prior to 1914;
Pacific Settlement Through the League of Nations;
Pacific Settlement Through the Permanent Court of International Justice;
Treaties on Pacific Settlement since 1920.

Strange as it may seem, the inspiration for these brilliant lectures came to
the author while he sat in the gallery of the United States Senate listening to the
debate concerning the Permanent Court of International Justice. As he heard
eminent voices on the floor expressing pride in the agencies of pacific settlement

1. I have a few minor quarrels. For instance, the closely held "personal"
corporation comes in for repeated mention; and its distinction from the "investment"
or "publicly held" corporation, as from the latter corporation's subsidiary, is repeatedly noted. Yet had the three been more rigorously severed in the author's thinking,
the book would have illumined two dark fields instead of one. I cannot help but feel
that the author's failure to castigate adequately the outrageous part of the Salomon
case rests in part on failure to keep these distinctions constantly in mind. Given
limited liability as an institution, the one-man corporation can claim its protection
with relative decency, and with some resulting social benefit. There are difficult
situations, to be sure, as so often under any institution; not all creditors, for instance, distinguish the proprietor's reputation from that of his company. But
where the Salomon case junks all functional justification is when the proprietor
is permitted to enforce a mortgage-in insolvency-on the corporate assets. Even
good faith plus a demonstrable fresh advance should not protect such a mortgage.
The least one can ask of a person claiming to venture only a fixed part of his
fortune is that outside creditors who are limited to that part get first benefit of
that part.
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originating before the War and belittling all advances since made, he became
convinced "that emphasis is needed on the 'pacific means' by which sixty-three
nations of the world have agreed to seek the settlement of their disputes 'of whatever
nature or of whatever origin they may be"' (p. 4).
The outstanding success of the Alabama Claims Arbitration in 1872 contributed
to the revival of peace movements in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Notable efforts prior to 1914 were the two Peace Conferences at the Hague in 1899
and 1907 resulting in codifying the pre-existing law as to the methods of dealing
with international disputes and in systematizing "a procedure for the organization
and conduct of International arbitration." Forty-five states now belong to one or
the other of said Conventions.
The effectiveness of the Hague Convention was greatly reduced by what
the author designates as a "weasel phrase;" the provision intimating an agreement
between the nations to have recourse to mediation before an appeal to arms, was
to operate only "as far as circumstances allow." However, provision was made
that the offer of good offices or mediation by a nation not involved in the dispute
could never be regarded "as an unfriendly act" (p. 7).
The Permanent Court of Arbitration was also created at the first Hague
conference, consisting of four members from each of the forty-five interested nations.
Few (possibly only one) of the cases since coming before the Permanent Court
of Arbitration "relate directly to situations in which the continuance of peace was
endangered,. . . but many of the cases ...

removed sources of friction which might

have festered." Many citizens of the United States in urging the adequacy of the
Court of Arbitration for the present day international disputes seem to overlook
the fact that in order to have a decision by that court the disputing nations have
to "agree upon the statement of the question to be arbitrated and upon the composition of the tribunal to which it would be referred." It cannot, therefore, be
regarded as an effective instrument for "obligatory settlement" (p. 15).
The situation during the period 1914-20 is splendidly phrased by the author
as follows:
"The magnificent Peace Palace at the Hague in which the Permanent
Court of Arbitration has its seat, had not been open for a year when the
clouds of 1914 began to rain their havoc upon a distraught Europe, caught
unaware. The Hague tradition proved too fragile to prevent the storm,
and as the world marched on toward Armageddon its gaze turned away
from the Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. A sacrifice of ten million
lives created a necessity for a new beginning, and for a time after 1918,
a stricken, subdued, and exhausted world seemed willing to abandon the
dogmas of nationalism for the ideal of a world order" (p. 19).
Being the product of a war-weary world the Covenant of the League of Nations
contains a larger measure of international agreement than was possible at any time
before or since. And while the birth most likely could not have occurred at any
other time in history, yet, because of the many new complexities resulting from
the War, "tremendous handicaps" surrounded its birth and many still persist.
Yet it "stands out as the highwater mark in the history of efforts to provide for
the pacific settlement of international disputes" (p. 21). In 1935 fifty-nine states
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were members, and since 1920 more than eighty-five sessions of its Council have
been held; and while many successes are among its achievements, it has also suffered
defeats. The author has great confidence in the League's usefulness over a long
period of time and considers the keeping alive of the Assembly and the Council of
the League of greater interest than the current success of these agencies, and we
are to infer that much lasting good is bound to result from the constant reoccurrences of these collective meetings.
The two main purposes of the League are "to promote international cooperation
and to achieve international peace and security," and the "heart of the covenant"
is expressed in Article Eleven as follows: "Any war or threat of war, whether
immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared
a matter of concern to the whole League" (p. 24). This truth seems to have been
a new discovery. At least prior to the World War, many nations acted apparently
oblivious to the fundamental principles underlying this declaration.
Members of the League are bound to submit to arbitration, judicial settlement
or inquiry "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture," and further agree not "to
resort to war until three months after the award ... or the judicial decision, or the
report by the Council" (pp. 28, 29).
If the disputants themselves misjudge the rupturing possibilities of the dispute,
members of the League still have the "friendly right" to bring the situation before
the League and thereby set in operation many conciliatory activities. And even
if the League does not have the power or having the power does not use it to
compel conciliation, yet judging from the past functioning of the League, no one
will deny that even disobedient or recalcitrant members are severely exposed to
peaceful ways. Such facilities for exposure did not exist before.
Many of the more than sixty disputes which have come before the League,
are interestingly reviewed by the author. While there have been sad and disappointing failures to prevent war, yet on the whole the results obtained give
ample ground for an optimistic outlook as to the League's future usefulness. It
is predicted that,
"the Covenant will live not as so much black ink on white paper,"
but "in ever changing conceptions and ever growing institutions which
respond to the needs of international society" (p. 45).
And in warning us against despair from delay we are reminded that, "It took
two centuries to enthrone the idea of the King's peace in medieval England" (p. 46).
The Permanent Court of International Justice popularly known as the World
Court, after a generation or more of effort, was created by the statute annexed to the
Protocol of Signature of December 16, 1920, signed by forty-nine states. While it
is administratively connected with the League, it does not exist under the Covenant
of the League but under the above Statute adopted by an independent international
document and functions in complete judicial independence. Sixty-one states maintain
the Court. Out of the seventy-two nations of the world, only Costa Rica, Egypt,
Sandi Arabi, United States and a few srrall states like Iceland and Liechtenstein
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do not share in its support. But its facilities are open even to the non-conforming
states should they signal for aid.1
With the League already in existence it was easy for the Nations creating the
court to reach an agreement that the Judges of the Court should be elected by a
majority vote of each of the League's two bodies.
One of the complex problems in the Court's creation and continuance involved
the question of the Court's jurisdiction. The Court was established upon the
principle that its jurisdiction depended upon the consent of the parties before it
and one of the provisions of the Statute is the so-called optional clause "under which
states desiring to do so might declare either when they accepted the Statute or
later, that between themselves the court would be competent at the request of a
single party (State) to adjudicate any dispute falling into the categories which
Article Thirteen of the Covenant had declared 'generally suitable for submission
to arbitration.'" Up to 1921 only ten states had thus given the court obligatory
jurisdiction. But by 1933 forty-two states had thus conferred obligatory jurisdiction.
And there are now more than 475 treaties or conventions listed with the Court
containing some provision for reference of disputes to the Court.
One of the surprising developments of the Court has been the growth and
usefulness of its advisory jurisdiction, in giving advisory opinions to the Council
or Assembly of the League. Advisory opinions are not binding. The Court,
however, arrives at its advisory opinions by the use of all the safeguards usually
present in judicial action, and "The result of this development has been a
frequent resort to this jurisdiction of the Court, and almost half of its time has been
given to requests which have emanated from the Council of the League of Nations.
Such is the confidence in the methods followed by the Court that the opinions
given have commanded great respect" (p. 57).
Notable among the advisory opinions are those involving a dispute between
Great Britain and France concerning certain nationality decrees issued by the
French authorities in Tunis and in the French Zone of Morocco and in the boundary
dispute between Czechoslavakia and Poland in the Jaworzina district, in both of
which cases the advisory opinions resulted in settlement of the disputes.

Striking examples of the effectiveness of the Court's opinions in contentious
cases are the Free Zone case involving a dispute between France and Switzerland
and the Eastern Greenland case involving a dispute between Denmark and

1. In this connection the writer deems it appropriate to state that although
the United States is not a signatory to the Court Protocol, yet it has been signally
honored in having some of its most distinguished citizens elected as Judges of the
Court and now has the very high and distinct honor of having one of its citizens, the
distinguished author, Dr. Manley 0. Hudson, serving as one of the Judges of the
Court. And the high esteem in which the author is held by the Nations of the
World is measured by the extraordinary fact that he was placed in nomination before
the elective body by the votes of the greatest number of states (40) ever given a
nominee for this high office, and later at the election, he received a majority of
the Council of the League, and in the Assembly of the League, he received the
votes of 48 Nations out of the 53 Nations voting.
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Norway. In each of these cases the losing parties promptly complied with the
Court's opinion. At no time has the Court's authority been flouted and its prestige
has been one of constant growth. The fact that the Court exists and is available,
in and of itself, produces an "invisible influence" for good, operating at all times
as an encouragement to settlement of disputes.
We are told that the creation of the Court will go down in history "as one of the
principal achievements in these post-war years in the field of international relations,"
and that it is "most improbable that our international community will ever again
be willing to be without some such agency" (p. 72).
Prior to 1920 few treaties, providing for arbitration of disputes, had been made.
Since that time many treaties have been made seeking to encourage arbitration of
international disputes. And while for the most part many of these treaties have
gone little beyond rendering "lip service" to the cause of arbitration, yet within the
last fifteen years marked progress has been made and among many of the newer
treaties the tendency toward obligatory arbitration is becoming more marked.
Some of the nations, including the United States, however, have not adopted treaty
style embracing compulsory conciliation of that type of dispute most apt to
lead to war.
One of the most noteworthy of recent treaties is the Briand-Kellogg Pact known
as the "Pact of Paris" signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Article Two of which reads
as follows:
"The High Contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution
of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they
may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by
pacific means" (p. 154).
Sixty-three nations have signed this Pact. The weakness of this treaty is that
by its terms it is not connected with the use of specific instrumentalities of peaceful
settlement. The author, however, regards it "as a binding undertaking behind which
rests the compulsive force of international law," and in conclusion states:
"Holding this view, I have undertaken with you a series of explorations
to determine how far the obligation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact can be
said to be implemented by the present-day law of pacific settlement. The
object of these lectures has been to describe and to enumerate the pacific
means which are now available to the parties to that instrument for seeking
the settlement of their disputes or conflicts, in order that they may not be
driven to violate their obligation. I think we can say that we have
found perhaps not adequate but at any rate numerous and various means
which are at the disposal of States for this purpose. If you share this view,
then we are able to say that Article 2 of the Briand-Kellogg Pact is not a
shot in the air; its force is not destroyed by its generality; avenues are in
front of us by traveling along which States may respect their obligation.
In other words, the Pact is, to this extent, implemented" (p. 93).
The book is so tersely and brilliantly written that I have found it difficult, and
in fact impossible, to reduce the same to any worth while review. It should be
widely read, and it is my opinion that no present day law graduate should be
permitted to go forth to the world until he has satisfied his Dean that he has
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read and studied this book, together with the text of the Convenants, Treaties,
Statutes and Protocols referred to in the text and conveniently printed in full in
the appendix.
St. Louis, Missouri.

FRED L. WILLIAMS

HOLMIES, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL. HIs BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETrERS
AND PAPERS. EDITED AND ANNOTATED BY HARRY C. SHRIVER. NEw YORK: CENTRAL BOOK COMPANY, 1936. pp. xiii, 280.

This is a precious book. In the first place it seems appropriate that this
reviewer of the book should give a brief description of its contents. The volume
is divided into three parts. Part one contains the early book reviews of Justice
Holmes; part two, some uncollected papers; and part three, Justice Holmes' letters
to Dr. Wu. It also contains a delightful introduction by Justice Harlan F. Stone,'
a friend, colleague and admirer of Justice Holmes, and a valuable appendix containing the bibliography of his works and of selected articles and a bibliography of
articles and books relating to the great American jurist.
This small volume is a worthy companion to the three great works of Holmes,
The Common Law (1881), Speeches (1890) and Collected Legal Papers (1920).
Justice Stone in his introduction aptly refers to the character of the two latter
volumes by using the language of Justice Holmes himself, who said of his expressions preserved between their covers, that they are "little fragments of my
fleece that I have left upon the hedges of my life." The present volume preserves
for posterity additional fragments that too are priceless.
Perhaps at this point this review should terminate. Certainly it is not easy
for the reviewer to give a suggestion of the rare qualities of the materials that make
up the contents of this delightful book. The early book reviews and notices that
appear in part one were written by Mr. Holmes in the early seventies when he
was editor of the American Law Review. 2 His realistic philosophy of law2 which

1. In a brilliant address, The Common Law in the United States, delivered at
Harvard Law School in 1936 (50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20), Justice Stone paid high
tribute to Justice Holmes saying: "As we examine the periods when the common
law has made its greatest progress, we realize that this is in fact nothing more than
the method which, consciously or unconsciously, the great judges have employed. It
is the judicial process which distinguished the work of Mansfield, Marshall, Kent, and
Holmes, and which has placed them among the outstanding judicial figures of the
past two hundred years."
2. John D. Lawson, formerly Dean of the Law School of the University of
Missouri, was the editor of the American Law Review, beginning in 1909, for many
years.
3. Justice Holmes in letters to Dr. Wu written in 1923 said: "I hope that
your interest in philosophy (and philosophy wisely understood is the greatest interest
there is) will not lead you too far from the concrete. My notion of the philosophic
movement is simply to see the universal in the particular, which perhaps is a
commonplace, but is the best of commonplaces if you realize that every particular
is as good as any other to illustrate it, subject only to the qualification, that some
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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guided his judicial4 action makes its appearance in these early writings. In a
review of The Science of Legal Judgment by Ram (1871) Mr. Holmes said:
"A treatise on the sources of the law which shall strike half way between the
somewhat latitudinary theorizing of Sevigny and the too narrow exclusiveness of
Austin, will form a chapter of jurisprudence which is not yet written, and which
is worthy of the ambition of an aspiring mind to write. Mr. Ram flew lower and
was content to pick up the fragments let fall here and there by the judges" (p. 6).
Justice Holmes' long life on the bench ((1883-1931) no doubt prevented this great
American legal scholar from writing such a book.
His book reviews dealt with law books of various kinds. In the review of the
book, Outlines of Roman Law by Green, an English barrister, he wrote in 1873:
"We have several times expressed our opinion that to study the Institutes is not the
easiest way to learn either law or jurisprudence, and that anyone intending to be a

can see it in one, some in another matter more readily, according to their faculties.
The artist sees the line of growth in a tree, the business man an opportunity in a
muddle, the lawyer a principle in a lot of dramatic detail. Great as is my respect for
Stammler I am a little afraid that he may tend to keep you too remote from daily
facts" (p. 164). "Of course you could read into the past whatever you like. But
if you are going to study law I shouldn't spend much more time on the generalities.
After such interests as have occupied you, details are apt to seem sordid and
uninteresting, but a horse must eat hay as well as oats and it is in trans-figuring
details that a man shows his power. I can't help believing that you will enrich
yourself more intellectually by studying the practical aspects of the law than by
attempting to see it sub specie aeternitatis" (p. 166).
Dean Pound in 1921 said of him (34 HA~v. L. REv. 452), "While it was still the
fashion to thrash over the barren straw of the controversy as to the nature and
definition of law, he was looking at the legal order functionally. As early as 1895 he
had given up the ideas of jurisprudence as a self-sufficient science, of law as something
to be measured by itself or judged by a critique derived from itself, and of legal
rules and doctrines as resting on their own basis."
Justice Cardozo, at the time on the New York Court of Appeals, in 1930 wrote
(44 HARv. L. REv. 682): "Little side-remarks and comments, falling from his lips
incidentally and casually, thrown off by the way in the discussion of a larger theme,
have in them stuff sufficient for a treatise or a library. Who else has been able to
pack a whole philosophy of legal method into a fragment of a paragraph, as in
those reverberating sentences on the opening page of his lectures on The Common
Law, written in comparative youth a half century ago? One can not renounce the
joy of quoting them, familiar though they are. The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book
of mathematics. The student of juristic method, bewildered in a maze of precedents,
feels the thrill of a new apocalypse in the flash of this revealing insight. Here is the
text to be unfolded. All that is to come will be development and commentary."
4. In Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 222 (1916), he said,
it will be recalled, in the dissenting opinion, "The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with which I have
disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact."
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lawyer ought to acquire a habit of thinking in terms of his own system before dallying
with another. It is not true that fundamental principles are more clearly brought
out in the Roman than in the English law" (p. 130).
There are many delightful bits of law and wisdom in part two of the book
which, as has been stated, contains some of his uncollected papers. His tribute to
his life long friend, John Chipman Gray, and his Recollections of Chief Justice Fuller
reveal a phase of his character, his capacity for great friendships, that, of course,
is not to be found in his judicial opinions. The author also prints in this portion of
the book Justice Holmes' only radio address, which was delivered upon the occasion
of the celebration by his friends on his ninetieth birthday anniversary, an address
that will never be forgotten by the thousands of his admirers who heard it. He
ended his brief message with this striking quotation from a Latin poet, "Death
plucks my ears and says Live-I am coming" (p. 142). Surely only a man of
great spiritual and mental proportions would have adopted and uttered that stately
sentiment. There also are printed his letters of resignation as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, which the author entitles "The Bow to
the Inevitable," and his letter to his associates on the bench on the occasion of his
resignation.
Perhaps part three of this book is the most delightful. Here there appear about
fifty letters written by Justice Holmes to Mr. John C. H. Wu over a period of about
eleven years. Mr. Wu at the date of the first letter was a Chinese student doing
graduate work in law at the University of Michigan. At that time he was about
twenty-two years of age. During this period, Mr. Holmes was a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, carrying more than his share of the heavy
burdens of that great office. The letters were published by Wu 5 in 1935 in the T'ien
Hsia Monthly. It is believed that they appear here for the first time in an American
publication.
The conteruts of these personal messages by the master to a brilliant student of
law and philosophy cannot be described adequately by this reviewer. They must be
read to be appreciated. They can be praised and they are praised. They are rare
bits of writing. They are gems and no devotee of this great man can possibly afford
not to read them. I am sure that the reader of these letters will regret the absence
from the volume of young Wu's letters of Justice Holmes. While one may understandingly read the published letters, it is believed that they would have been even
more interesting had Wu's letters also been printed.
Many phases of intellectual life are alluded to in these interesting letters. They
also contain many items of sound advice to the young Oriental legal scholar, helpful
and inspiring to young or old legal scholars in any land. In the first letter printed,
written in April, 1921, the earnest young scholar was told by his venerable mentor,
"One cannot jump at once to great ends. Therefore, I hope you will not shirk the

5. Dr. John C. Wu was formerly Judge of the Shanghai Provisional Court and

Principal of the Comparative Law School of China.
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details and drudgery that life offers6 but will master them as the first step to bigger
things. One must be a soldier before one can be a general" (p. 151). As the correspondence betwen Justice Holmes and Mr. Wu progressed it became evident to
the former that the younger Chinese was not a beginner in the study of law and
philosophy, though he was, as has been stated, young in years, but a brilliant student
who already had accomplished much. The letters that follow contain allusions to
law, literature, philosophy, politics, religion, in fact to all the important intellectual
things that interested the great American scholar and jurist. Much of his philosophy
appears in these letters. In one he wrote, "I do not believe or know anything about
absolute truth" (p. 165). In them also is revealed personal qualities of the great
man. One letter shows his kindliness and courtesy when he informed his young
Chinese friend about the availability of rooms at a Washington club when the
young man had planned a visit to Washington. Mr. Holmes wrote, "Please write to
let me know at once also whether you would prefer a $2.00 or $2.50 room if one can
be had" (p. 171). In several of the letters he referred to the fact that he did not
read the newspapers. However, considering his great labors on the bench, his
reading took a wide range and was most intensive, as the letters also reveal. Many
times in his letters he speaks of his age and expresses some apprehension that the
end of his judicial labors may be near. In 1923 he wrote, "I am idling and trying
to store up strength as I am not as strong as I was and as I want to try another year
on the Bench" (p. 166). When his young friend in one letter complained of "this
miserable world," Justice Holmes replied, "I imagine that you are at the time of life
when the staying power of your enthusiasm will be most tried. For me at least
there came moments when faith waivered. But there is the great lesson and the
great triumph if you keep the fire burning until, by and by, out of the mass of
sordid details 6 there comes some result, be it some new generalization or be it a
transcending spiritual repose. I am working away as usual" (p. 176). No more
should be said of these letters. Indeed, they must be read to be fully appreciated.
No review of this book is at all adequate without mention being made of
the excellent annotations by the editor, Mr. H. C. Shriver, a member of the bar of
the District of Columbia. Throughout the book there are valuable footnote references
and comments, terse in style and informative. For example, there are brief sketches
of the leading writers in philosophy and jurisprudence mentioned by Justice Holmes
with a brief characterization of the nature of their writings. In the review by Holmes
of Holland's Essays upon the Form of the Law, the editor in a footnote gives the
date of the birth and the death of Sir Thomas Erskine Holland, states his professorship and says of him that, "He is regarded as an analytical jurist" (p. 41). References
like this, and there are literally hundreds of them, appear throughout the pages of

6. Chief Justice Hughes wrote these words of Justice Holmes on the occasion
of his ninetieth birthday (44 H~Av. L. REV. 677), "The extraordinary thing is that
he never seems to be bored by the unending and familiar task. For nearly fifty
years he has been hearing arguments and deciding cases, but to each case he brings
an undiminished interest and unflagging zeal."
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this book. While no doubt the footnote as to Holland will not be needed by great
numbers of the readers of this volume, yet there are references to many other
important writers on law and philosophy7 and references to texts" and decisions
which will be of great aid to the average reader in obtaining the fullest enjoyment
of these pages.
This book is destined to be widely read by law students and members of the
legal profession and others interested in the fine writing of the foremost American
scholars. It is a valuable addition to American literature.
School of Jurisprudence, University of California

J. P.

McBAINE

J.

TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING. By WALTER
DERENBERG, WITH
FOREWORD BY EDWARD S. ROGERS. ALBANY: MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY,

1936. pp. 1075.
This is not just another textbook. It is unique in its origination and exceedingly
meritorious in content.
Our American and English law of trade-marks is not a heritage from the time
of the Year Books. It is amazingly recent in origin and development.' Nor, as in
the case of some European and most Latin American systems, is it founded upon
the proposition that a trade-mark is property in the absolute, created by, or pursuant to, legislative fiat as in the case of patents or copyrights. With us a trademark does not exist as property in and of itself, but only as an incident to property,
viz., a business. The trade-mark does not exist, and is not assignable, except as an
incident to the goodwill of the business with which it is used. 2 And whatever rights
there are in trade-marks exist basically not upon any statutory grant but in the nonstatutory substantive law. The Federal Trade Mark Registration Act 3 does not,
in the main, create substantative rights but essentially only affords an additional
forum-the Federal Courts-for the protection and enforcement, at the instance
of registrants thereunder, of substantive rights otherwise existing.4
Dr. Derenberg, of European birth and education, after completing his scholastic
education at the University of Hamburg, Germany, and Gray's Inn, London, and
admission to the Bar in Germany in 1928, came to New York to study this field of

7. For examples: Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanaes (32); Teremy Bentham
(34); C. C. Langdell (89); Herbert Spencer (106); Henri Louis Bergson (155);
Benedetto Croce (156).
8. Mirror of Justices (15).
1. See Fathchild, Statutory Unfair Competition (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 20, 21,
and Static and Dynamic Concepts of the Law of Unfair Competition, id. at 299, 301.
2. Du Pont Company v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100, 102 (1917); United Drug
Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918).
3. 15 U. S. C. A. § 81.
4. United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Griggs-Cooper & Co., 279 U. S.
156 (1929); Beckwith v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U. S. 538, 543 (1920).
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cur law for purposes of comparative exposition to continental lawyers. While here,
he became associated with the office of the United States Trade Mark Association.
In 1930 he was delegated as a member of the Bar of Germany to participate in the
sessions of the Trade Mark Committees of the International Law Association which
met in New York in that year. In 1931 he returned to Germany as Assistant Legal
Advisor to the Berlin Chamber of Commerce. The results of this research were then
developed ifito a book published in Germany in 1931, giving to the continental
lawyers an analytical and comparative exposition of our American law of trademarks and unfair competition. 5 The book was well received-leading American
reviewers recommending that it be translated for our own use., In 1933 Dr. Derenberg became Assistant Secretary of the United States Trade Mark Association and
shortly thereafter lecturer on Industrial Property Law at New York University
School of Law.
In the present book Dr. Derenberg has given us more than a translation of his
German publication. It is an originally constructed treatise on the American law of
trade-marks, registered and unregistered, and the immediately related subject-matters.
Particularly in this field of the law is the mechanistic application of precedent
fatal. Dr. Derenberg is aware of that and makes the reader definitely aware of that.
Nevertheless, an analytic perspective is given which leaves the reader with a sense
of comprehension and not confusion. Thus, while the decisions are not presented
as so many ponderous solids to be pyramided in the construction of an historical
oddity, neither are they lightly tossed about in gusts of scholasticism. The trends
of development are analytically portrayed; criticism, when made, is respectful and
intelligent; and the reader is given a synthesis of these trends and criticisms which
makes the book an intensely practical compendium for the judiciary, practitioners
and law faculty alike. An appendix setting forth, principally, the statutes, federal

and state, and the international conventions pertinent to the subject-matter add to
the practical value of the volume.
The work and its author are justly entitled to a position of authoritative recognition in this field of our law.
IRvIN H. FATHCHILD
Chicago, Ill.

A

PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS, LIBRARY EDITION. By JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE. WASHINGTON,

D. C.:

WASHINGTON LAW BOOK COMPANY,

1936.

pp. 1206.
Eight years after its original appearance in a three-volume edition, handsomely
bound, autographed by the author, resplendent with colored pictures, illustrated by

5. WARENZEICHEN UND WETrBEWERBSRECHT IN DEN VEREININGTEN
VON AMERIKA, Berlin, 1931.

STAATEN

6. Book Reviews: Morgan, 45 HARv. L. REv. 954; Schiller, 32, COL. L. REv. 160;
Schechter, 80 PA. L. REv. 148.
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charts, graphs, photographic reproductions of inscriptions in stone and in clay tablets
as well as of ancient manuscripts on parchment or papyrus, embellished by reproductions of title pages of famous first editions, likenesses of men famous in the
law, and pictures of law buildings, ancient and modern, Dean Wigmore's Panorama is
now being offered to the public in this new form.
"In this one-volume Library Edition," says the author, "the text and the pictures
are substantially the same (except that none are colored) as in the three-volume
de luxe edition of 1928. But the text has been amplified by some paragraphs on
Ethiopia, Mongolia, Nepal, and Tibet, and by the addition of several hundred
citations of recent books and articles (in English) in the reading lists at the end of
each chapter. And several new pictures (mostly not before published) have been
added for Ethiopia, Tibet, and other countries" (viii).
A thorough scholar, a great master of those departments of the law which he
has made his own special field, endowed with a mind stored with legal learning
remarkable both for its vast comprehensiveness and its accuracy, possessing extraordinary analytical power, deep insight into the philosophic bases of law, and a
true historian's appreciation of the development of legal institutions and of the
interplay of the forces that have given shape to them, Professor Wigmore has set for
himself the task of presenting in brief compass, not, primarily, the facts of the
various legal systems he discusses, nor chiefly, the development of the legal institutions of the various systems, but the comparative development of the various
legal systems throughout their whole history. And according to this objective, the
work must be judged. There would be no room in its twelve hundred and six
pages for a satisfactory presentation, e. g., of the Anglo-American legal system, the
common law as we call it-the Anglican system as Professor Wigmore, indulging
his penchant for improvement of existing terminology, has preferred to style it. The
same is true of ancient Roman law, of canon law, of Germanic law, of modern
Roman or civil law-Romanesque law in Professor Wigmore's terminology. It would
be quite out of consonance with the aim and scope of the book to include such
presentations. To accuse the book of being sketchy and superficial on the ground
that it lacks them would be quite beside the mark. It seems to this reviewer that
the book must be judged according to its professed aims and purposes,--to present

the development of the various systems in their main outlines; to throw into bold
relief the salient features of the law in each stage of its development, and to compare
them with those of the corresponding stages in the other systems.
And this is what Professor Wigmore has done. His method of presentation
is simple and direct, but graphic and dramatic withal. Let us take for example
his chapter on the law of Greece, i. e., chiefly, the law of Ancient Athens. He
describes very clearly and in broad outline the characteristic features of the administration of justice in Homeric times. In the Homeric description of the scenes

depicted on the shield of Achilles, he says, "We see the democratic type of justice
precisely as in the primitive Germanic period, one thousand years later; the parties

plead their cause before the assembly of freemen; the chief presides as umpire;
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then the wise ELDERS,' skilled in the law, propose various judgments; then the
freemen acclaim the best one and thus decide the case" (p. 289). On the same page
appears the following paragraph, concisely setting forth another characteristic of
Greek law:
"The spirit of Greek justice, however, in classical times, was not theocratic,

as in the earlier Oriental systems already described, but was secular; and civil
officials, not priests, administered it."
Then follows a discussion of the administration of justice in the period beginning
with the legislation of Solon, in which it is pointed out that the administration of

justice was not in the hands of magistrates, judges, and professional lawyers, but in
the hands of non-professionals. The way this system worked in actual practice is
illustrated by the trial of Socrates. The procedure of civil litigation is shown
by an account of a famous trial about 100 B. C. on the island of Cos. (p. 314 et seq.)
The most important element to be considered in the Athenian procedure is the jurysystem and the method of trial. This is brought before the reader by a lengthy
quotation from Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, containing the account of the
Athenian jury system, and by an extract from Lucian's humorous skit, "The Double
Indictment." This kind of administration of justice is characterized and its effects
upon the development of law is succinctly set forth on pages 310 et seq. Again he
presents one of the "private orations" of Demosthenes. A private oration is a
speech written by a "speech-writer" for a client, who committed the speech to
memory and delivered it at the trial as if it were his own, for at that time a litigant
could not be represented by counsel. From all of this we get a very vivid picture
of the administration of justice in both criminal (or political) and private cases.
We see the multitudinous 'dicasts' or jurymen, sitting as triers both of fact and of
law, not guided by judicial directions, deciding all questions without any collective
deliberation, simply by casting a ballot into an urn, thereby rendering a judgment
from which there is no appeal. We see the parties litigant standing before these
multitudes of their fellow-citizens, pleading their causes in person, it is true, but
in the words of a highly trained orator who is skilled in all the tricks of persuading
and misleading a multitude. We hear the sophistic argumentation under a legal
system which knows no rules of law, has no established precedents, but only statutes,
the only interpretation of which is that which the 'dicasts' choose to put upon them
in the instant case under the influence of the persuasiveness of the orator. We hear
the bald, unblushing appeals to passion and prejudice, and we marvel at the fact
that communal life was possible under such an administration of justice. And we
understand why this highly gifted race developed no enduring system of law, why
"Greek law now interests only the historian and the philologist" (p. 368).
As to the effect of this system, the author quotes the words of Aristotle: "The
democracy has made itself master of everything, and administers everything by its
votes in the assembly and in the law courts, in which it holds the supreme power"

1. The capitals are the reviewer's.
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(p. 312). And again of a modern critic, Mr. William Forsyth: "They [precedents]
could not be invoked authoritatively to restrain the predatory instincts of the jurors
when the Athenian people, as in B. C. 410-405, had become embittered against its
citizens of wealth and standing by injury, suspicion, and misery (p. 314).
"The consequences were, accordingly, deplorable. A set of acrid politicians and
sycophants, headed by Epigenes, Demophantus, and Cleigenes encompassed the
exile, disfranchisement, or judicial murder of many persons. Others they blackmailed
by threat of indictment . . . It was in this Athens that Plato became of age to
consider the plan and purpose of his life, and of it he was probably thinking when
long afterwards he wrote that there was in it 'but a very small remnant of honest
followers of wisdom.' These he thought 'might be compared to a man who has
fallen among wild beasts: he will not be one of them, but he is too unaided to
make head against them; and before he can do any good to society or his friends,
he will be overwhelmed and perish miserably.'"
If comparative law, like history, is to serve as the revered teacher of mankind,
let modern statesmen and politicians study the course of unrestrained democracy,
i.e., of unrestrainedpopularmajorities.
But the picture of Greek law is not unrelieved blackness. On page 337 et seq.
the author presents selected portions of the laws of Gortyna (about 400 B. C.), a
law of Solon's, and an enactment of B. C. 300. These selections show that the
Greeks, within an incredibly short time, developed remarkable skill in legislative
draftsmanship. That they developed equal, nay, much greater skill in the art
of drafting transactional documents is shown by the specimens given on pages
346-358. The presentation of this concrete material is followed in each case by a
terse summing up of the salient features of the documents presented, by an illuminating trenchant critical estimate of the inferences to be drawn from them as to
the nature and development of the law of the period.
And this reviewer would submit that it is in these brief characterizations no less
than in the apt selection of documents that the real value of the work lies. These
summaries are not hastily drawn inferences and unsupported generalizations. They
are result of penetrating analysis based on an accurate knowledge of the history
of the period and its law as well as of legal institutions and legal history in general,
which enables the author to arrive at a reliable critical estimate.
In substantially the same manner, the author has treated the remaining systems
of his Panorama. The systems chosen for discussion are: the Egyptian, the Mesopotamian (Babylon and Asyria), the Hebrew, the Chinese, the Hindu, the Greek,
the Roman, the Japanese, the Mohammedan, the Keltic, the Slavic, the Germanic,
the Maritime, the Papal (or Canon), the Romanesque (meaning the modern Roman
or Civil), and the Anglican (meaning the Anglo-American).
One would not, perhaps, call this a scientific treatise on comparative law.
Perhaps the presentations are too sketchy. This, however, is true: it contains the
materials for comparative legal study. The avowed object of the author is to
stimulate among the brethren of the law, especially among the common-law lawyers,
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an interest in comparative study of law. And by this he means not only a study of
other legal systems "as facts" as he puts it, or merely a comparative study of legal
doctrines and institutions with a view to improving our own systems of law by
availing ourselves of the experience of others, but a comparative study of legal

systems as wholes, a study of their origins, their life histories, the forces that cause
them to survive or perish. There is no doubt in the mind of this reviewer that
the book is admirably adapted to the accomplishment of this purpose. He hopes
that the book will find its way into every law office, into every high school, college,
university, and public library of the United States. In the last paragraph of the
Preface to the present edition, Professor Wigmore says: "May this volume contribute to a better understanding of other peoples, and thus help towards greater
intelligence and mutual toleration in world affairs!" In this 'pium desiderium' this
reviewer joins. There is much need among us for greater intelligence and mutual
toleration. There is nothing more dangerous than the idea, hugged close to one's
heart, that one's own way of managing public affairs, one's own institutions, are
much superior to those of other nations. Too much self laudation does not make for
international friendship and mutual toleration.
The author sets great store by the illustrations that adorn the pages of this
book. And this reviewer by no means is insensible to the measure of interest,
enjoyment, and profit that they contribute to its value. It is true, for some time
it has been possible to capture the popular imagination much more readily by an
appeal to the eye than an appeal to the mind. An excavation, e. g., of an ancient
Greek city is more valuable as a news item than a book shedding a new light upon
Platonic philosophy. And one instinctively rebels against that sort of thing.
Nevertheless, it is true that the things of the mind are intimately connected with the
concrete things of the time and the place. A glance at a picture of the Roman
forum, of a basilica, of the Parthenon, of the Pnyx, or of Westminster Hall adds an
indefinable something to the beholder's knowledge and understanding of the events
that transpire there. These pictures of buildings, of great men of the law, of legal
records and documents not only stimulate the reader's interest but convey something to him that could not be conveyed in any other way.

George Washington University Law School
A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

CHICAGO: CALLAGHAN AND Co.

VALTER L. MOLL

By

RAY ANDREWS

BROWN.

1936. pp. lxxx, 722.

In the organization of its material, this text book follows the tradition set
by the standard case books in the field. After a short introductory chapter, the
author takes up, in this order, the acquisition and loss of property rights by occupancy, possession of wild animals, finding, adverse possession under statutes of
limitation, accession, confusion and gift, with a light touch upon rights acquired
through sale. This takes up about 225 pages (a third of which is devoted to gifts).
The next 400 pages are devoted to various situations concerning what can roughly
be termed incidents of divided property rights, viz. bailments (including the bailment
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aspects of carriers and inn-keepers), liens and pledges.
eighty pages, fill out the rest of the text of the book.

Fixtures and implements,

The material of the various chapters is extremely well organized. A student
supplementing his class-room work by its reading cannot fail to be aware of a continuity and unity that may well otherwise escape him. The author's treatment of
even difficult points is set out with a clarity that would be hard to improve, although
in this respect section 136, dealing with the effects of tortious conversion by the
pledgee, is not so clear as some of the rest of the work.
It is pleasing to find in the author a distrust of some of the concepts he is
working with. Thus, at the very beginning of his chapter on Bailments, he intimates
that "bailment or no bailment" is a false posing of issues: "It might be well, therefore, if we could abandon the search for the definitions and elements of bailment,
and confine ourselves to a consideration of the various rights and duties which
arise when one person has possession of goods, which belongs to another" (p. 226).
In the same vein, the author states: "Apparently, then, the delivery of a locked
receptacle is for one purpose a bailment of the contents and for another purpose is
not" (p. 234). Still again, referring to cases considering the duty of care of goods
by an involuntary bailee: "It is submitted that in both of these cases the courts
proceed wrongly in endeavoring to decide the question by asking whether or not
there is bailment" (p. 362)., The reviewer agrees most heartily. A disheartening
feature of this phase of the law is the useless dragging-in of the bailment concept to
confuse the situation and befog the issue-as if there were some magic quality in the
word "bailment" which gives insight into legal problems. For instance, to prevent
evasion of inheritance taxes, statutes often forbid safe-deposit companies, upon the
death of their customer, to let the personal representative or joint survivor of the
decedent get the contents of the deposit box without notifying the tax officials of
the time and place of the intended opening of the box; and violation subjects the
safe-deposit companies to fine and payment of the tax. Such statutes have been
attacked as unconstitutional by the companies. And nearly every time the court
has seen fit to approach the problem thus: is this a bailment or no bailment? But
bailment has nothing to do with it. Is not the safe deposit company in strategic
position to prevent access to the box? Again, suppose a purchaser of goods, erroneously insisting that title has not passed to him, tries to return the goods; the seller
refuses to take them back; the buyer leaves them in a corner on the floor of seller's
premises; the seller simply leaves them alone for several years; finally they are
destroyed by moths; the buyer (having finally paid the purchase price) sues the
seller for negligence in failing to take proper care of the goods. This resolves itself
into whether there was a duty upon the defendant to take reasonable care. Well,
what determines in tort law when you have a duty or not? Answer that and you
begin to have a solution to the problem. But that's hard to answer in tort law. So,
it's made to look easy by calling the transaction a bailment or not a bailment. The
author, though he does not emphasize the point, has done a real service to practicing
lawyers as well as to law students in warning them against the danger of false
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issues, not only as to bailments but also as to fixtures (p. 630), emblements (pp.
690-691) and other concepts.

As the author points out in his Preface, this book is designed primarily for law
students. More particularly, it seems designed, to judge from the organization of
the material, for those studying the traditional course in Personal Property from
one of the standard case-books. In many law schools, this course will probably
continue to be taught as such instead of having the material covered therein reorganized and parcelled out in other subjects-if for no other reason than the

difficulty of finding a suitable substitute for beginning law students. Consequently
Professor Brown's book is assured of welcome reception by both law teachers and
students. It has been extremely difficult for law teachers in the past to suggest a

satisfactory book to supplement the class-room discussion. This book is the answer.
University of Missouri School of Law

CASES AND

ELVIN R. LATrY

MATERIALS ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS.

BY

THURMAN

ARNOLD AND FLEMING JAMES, JR. ST. PAUL: WEST PUBLISHING Co.,

W.

1936.

pp. xxvii, 869.
If you like to see in their appropriate places the use of such words or expressions
as "the ritual of the courts," "current formulae," "cherished ideas" of the past,
"ceremonial requirements," "the phenomenon," "symmetrical ideology," "theological
difficulties" of the law, "equitable formulae," "argumentive technique," "devices of
the law," "ancient conceptions," "doctrinaire cases," "useless formalities," "pragmatic criteria," "sentimental attractiveness," "interesting survivals," "symbolic
traps," "mystical ideas," and "mystical attitudes," you will find them all, and more,
nicely placed in this new volume by Thurman W. Arnold and Fleming James, Jr.
This terminology is representative of the approach to the subject which in some
places is new in its development and in others is but the invention of a new set of
quasi-legalistic appellations and a rearranged fashionable classification for the preexisting legalistic terminology and the more simple chronological arrangement of the
usual topics covered in the common subject of trial and appellate practice. The

war paint and attractive feathers with which the subject is decorated, together with
the beating of the drums of dissatisfaction with things as they are, may have the
effect of engaging stimulating reactions in the new bloods in the law. The book is
good growing food for law students. It is well seasoned for those who enjoy
devouring the sweets of criticism. It satisfies the basic need for knowing trial and
appellate practice as it is. The latter point is stressed by the editors, who state that
"much of the material in this book deals with underlying attitudes and phobias
which the writers consider must be understood and taken into account by the
trial attorney. In studying them there is no thought of either criticism or praise.
This does not mean we are opposed to legal reform. It only means that we consider
the attitude of detached observation more suitable for purposes of understanding
the situation, whether that understanding be used for general reform or for the
narrower objective of advancing the cause of a particular client" (p. vi).
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The arrangement of this book and the inclusion of so much subject matter not
ordinarily presented in a casebook on trial and appellate practice give rise to many
questions. Would not a more simple and orderly presentation of the development of
a trial, from its commencement to its conclusion, with emphasis upon the troublesome problems with which courts and lawyers must constantly deal, be a more
effective treatment of the subject? Does the arrangement adopted give the law
student a clear-cut picture of the trial problem? Will the student learn a great deal
about trials in general, without comprehending the significance of what he learns
as it relates to a particular trial? Does the book try to do too much, to cover the
whole field in omnibus, rather than the specific problem of trial practice? It may be
legitimately asked: What is left for the other related courses? It steals some
of the nicest materials from the course of Jurisprudence, robs choice morsels from
the course of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, trespasses into the area of Constitutional Law, excludes the need of teaching a large part of Conflict of Laws in a
separate course, and digs deep into the essentials of Administrative Law. Is this
material, which is specifically a part of these other courses, better transferred to the
already crowded course of trial practice? There is, to a considerable extent, a sound
basis for this expansion, because a comprehensive understanding of trial practice
involves all of these subjects. Indeed, it might be claimed that trial practice should
include most of the courses of the law school; why teach any others? A division
of this subject matter has heretofore been regarded beneficial, and has not, if
properly taught, prevented an appreciation of the interrelationship of different
courses. If the book should be used as intended, in the first year of law study, the
students might wonder, without total absence of rationality, why two more years
should be spent in the law school. True it is that the subject of trials, judgments
and appeals is associated with Conflicts, Constitutional Law, Federal Jurisdiction,
Equity, Administrative Law, Pleading, and if well taught can not escape inclusion
of some of the exciting problems of Jurisprudence. This is the first casebook on
the subject, however, which more or less definitely tries to do the whole job at
once. As trials deal with the application of substantive law, it might be claimed that
the whole study of law should be included in an enlarged three-year study of trial
practice, in all of its applications and ramifications. Conceding that the trial practice
course might encompass a much wider field than it does, it is quite possible that
in attempting to do so much the true goal of such a course is missed, and many
matters worthy of more complete treatment in trial practice are underemphasized
or omitted. A relational comprehension of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure,
Administrative proceedings, and trial practice in law and equity is important. It
is, however, not necessary to go into each of those fields in detail in the trial
practice course in order to appreciate their differences and overlapping, or the
possibilities in each of the respective fields.
A study of the system of trials from the commencement of a case through
appeal offers more than may be covered in the time ordinarily allowed for the
course. With the recent emphasis on discovery before trial, declaratory judgments,
executions and auxiliary proceedings, and the problem of submission of law cases to
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juries, the subject is already overcrowded. I daresay that if the editors of this
book were also teaching the other subjects which they have included, they would not
have incorporated so much outside material. Furthermore, it is quite reasonable to
leave for Federal Jurisdiction and for Administrative Law the task of distinguishing
their fields from others and of showing their availability for the handling of legal
problems. The merger of all trials and hearings of all kinds, wherever found, is
surely a vigorous attempt to handle the entire matter with one stroke. Would a
piecemeal process be better? It is not believed that this is as effective as taking
each major subject independently, and in the treatment of each correlating it with
the whole field. The use of this book would require the reorganization of a
considerable part of the regular law school curriculum, or cause unreasonable
duplication in other courses.
Without intending to fall into the ritual of damning a book with criticism,
and closing by sweetening it with words of praise, I think it must be said that the
use of materials as well as cases, the inclusion of new types of materials, the writing
of chapter introductions and comprehensive approaches to the different subjects considered, the footnotes and references, and the selection of cases are excellent. The
modernistic expressions of the various formulae, rituals, conceptions, techniques
and ideologies, reflect our present-day evaluating process in trial practice problems.
They are now common language in the classroom in discussing trial practice problems
presented in other types of casebooks, and are evidenced in practically all presentday law review writing. Arnold and James bring this approach into casebook form.
Those who feel that too many fields have been included will undoubtedly regret
that the type of treatment given could not have been developed for the usual subject
matter of the trial practice course. Some may feel that the treatment of this
phase of the book is over-done. The editors have realized the significance and need
of thorough trial practice training in the law school, and of the demand upon the
law graduate to understand and be able to use the offensive and defensive weapons
employed in litigation. They state that "the difference between the point of view of
this book and that of most casebooks is the same difference in approach to a legal
problem which exists between the appellate court judge and the trial attorney."
The trial attorney's interest "must center not in the social or legal problem, but on
the strategy of the suit" (p. vi). Although the book is critical in character, it
nevertheless shows the law as it is, and emphasizes resourcefulness in selecting the
available existing means to attain the legal end. Some of the cases are used to
show the mistakes and errors which have caused lawyers to fall into the traps of
the present system of trials. These cases are not used, as often, with the idea of
eliminating a chance for mistakes by reform procedure, but of escaping them through
an understanding of how to use effectively the procedure as it is. Indeed, some
of the procedure assailed by the reformer is objectionable only to those who do not
know how to use it.
Trial practice is believed by the reviewer to be more appropriate for the third
year of law study than for the first. This casebook is adapted for either place,
although it is used by the editors in the first year. To study the instruments of
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procedure in as complete a form as presented in this casebook, before studying the
substantive law subjects, is analogous to the study of surgery before the medical
student is grounded in anatomy. In the third year, students are thinking in terms
of practice, and the problems are appreciated and remembered in a way that would
not be possible in earlier stages. Upon this, however, there is a reasonable difference
of opinion. The time when a book is to be used to a considerable extent determines
its subject matter. Some of the material here included would be unnecessary
later, when students have become familiar with it through other courses.
In the face of the criticism which has been presented, the editors are to be
commended upon the thoroughness of their work, the interesting or even exciting
use of cases and materials, and the valuable emphasis which they have placed upon
procedure as a course of law school study. The reviewer, however, would have
preferred to have less mysticism in revealing the already mystical problem of
courts and trials.
Iowa Law School

CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS.

E.

MASON LAnD

By
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SEcOND EDITION By HORACE
1936. pp. xvi, 781.

WHITESIDE. ST. PAUL: WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY,

A great deal of water has gone over the dam since 1918 when Albert M. Kales
brought out the first abridged edition of his Cases on Future Interests. Much has
been said and written about methods of law teaching and the inclusion of non-legal
subject matters in the law curriculum. A different type of classroom book usually
known as "Cases and Materials," has made its appearance. Against this background
of change, Prof. Whiteside has brought out a second edition of Kales' Cases which is
just that: a second edition of the same book. It reflects great credit both on the
fundamental soundness of the original work and on the good judgment of the
editor, that the new edition need make no apology for its appearance, but on the
contrary is extremely well adapted to fill a presently existing need.
The preface to the first edition states that the abridged work was designed for
use in a two hour, one semester course. Such a course would be hopelessly overloaded by much of the material contained, for example, in Leach's Cases and
Materials on Future Interest, or in Powell's two volume work (even excluding
the subjects of Trusts and Wills). Prof. Whiteside's Kales gives the minimal essentials
of the classic course on Future Interests briefly enough for the time limit set, with
an excellent balance between the old and new cases, but (save for footnote references)
without the inclusion of other materials.
The outline of the first edition has been followed almost exactly and the teacher
will find comparatively few strangers among the cases discussed. Out of some
seventy cases not embodied in the first edition, twenty-two are found either in
Leach's Cases and Materials or in Powell's one volume case book, while others are
either in Powell's two volume combined case book or in Kales' longer edition. The
footnotes are considerable more complete than in the old edition, including statutory,
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text and law review citations, together with problems related to the principal case
which should make for a convenient and "teachable" book.
Excellent judgment was shown in the selection of points on which new cases
were substituted. In fields where the modem rules can hardly be understood apart
from the historical development, such as the "Rule against Perpetuities," the old
cases remain with insignificant changes. But where the impingement of old rules
upon new conditions and new types of property settlement is the matter of greatest
interest, as with the rules of construction governing class gifts, gifts over, and the
vesting and divesting of interests, there is a much greater admixture of recent
cases.'

If this section at times gives rise to the suspicion that certain new cases have
been substituted for the old for no reason other than later date, so be it. The rules
are equally well illustrated by the more recent opinions and the student is shown,
what he might otherwise doubt, that in legal practice problems of future interests
did not disappear with the death of the great John Chipman Gray.
Two beneficial changes in organization are the inclusion of a chapter on
statutory modifications of the "Rule against Perpetuities" and the elimination of
that chapter which in the first edition made cursory examination of "limitations to
classes" a hundred and fifty pages before the more lengthy discussion of the interpretation of class gifts. There are other sections of the book in which the
earlier edition has been closely followed, when in this reviewer's opinion more
departure would have been preferable. For example, one hundred fourteen pages
of case material are devoted to powers, and although several new cases have been
added, the treatment is little changed. Here might have been an excellent place for
cutting, or for the substitution of text for cases. The space thus saved could well
be devoted to some consideration of the value, incidents and legal protection of the
various future interests, problems which bring the law into closer touch with
reality.
Another defect in arrangement is the separation of rules limiting the duration
and protection of equitable interests into two sections, one under the "Rule against
Perpetuities" and the other under "Restraints on Alienation." Prof. Whiteside's
new cases, even more clearly than those in the old edition, show that the distinction
between the two sections is in the language of the opinions and not in the problems
decided. If these cases are to be handled as a part of this course at all, rather
than in Trusts, they should at least be handled as a unit.
But criticism along this line must lead to debate about the proper organization
and content of the future interests course and the value of the traditional casebook.
Such topics are beyond the scope of this review. As to this book, it is enough to say
that the editor marked out his task, held himself within its limits, and did it well.
Chicago, Ill.

GEORGE

F. JAMES,

JR.

1. Although the material on these points covers less than one-sixth of the
book, about a third of the new cases are here included.
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